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The High-Level Conference on the Rohingya Muslims (and Other Minorities) held on 30 September 2025 at the UN General Assembly in New York has now concluded.

                                           UN Webcast of the morning session

                                           UN Webcast of the afternoon session

                                           Statement by the Representative of the Russian Federation

                                           Statement by the US Representative

                                           Statement by the UK Representative .

                                           Statement by the Representative of France (available at 02.11.00 morning session)

                                           Statement by the Representative of China (available at 23.01 afternoon session)

                                           Statement by Dr Muhammad Yunus (available at 01.44.08 morning session)

                                           UN Webcast Side-Event 29 September 2025: Community-centered Action

                                           UN Press Office Release on the Conference

                                           UN "Concept Note" of the Conference

                                           Background Papers to the Conference 

UN Rohingya Conference Must Spark Concrete Action

Alexis Capati  and Catherine Cooper: Robert F Kennedy Human Rights - 3 October 2025

Comment by Derek Tonkin on Twitter – 5 October 2025

So what “concrete action” might now follow? The current President of the UN General Assembly (PGA), former German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has the impossible task of preparing an “action-oriented summary” based on the discussion at the Conference. At the Conference China and Russia, Permanent Members of the Security Council, made it crystal clear that, in their view, progress can only be made through dialogue and discussion between Bangladesh and Myanmar, and that, in China’s words, “this must not involve forced intervention or imposed solutions”. Russia thinks the same.

Dr Yunus though presented a Seven-Point Plan of which Point 2 proposes: “Exert effective pressure on Myanmar and the Arakan Army to end violence against the Rohingya and begin sustainable repatriation, starting with those recently arrived in Bangladesh and those internally displaced”. This China and Russia will never accept. The Arakan Army also rejects these aspersions as totally unwarranted.

So how will the PGA satisfy both Dr Yunus on the one hand and China and Russia on the other? Obviously the PGA cannot, so she will have to fudge it somehow. She understands this, but then it was not her fault that there was no consensus on action. As for the Arakan Army (AA), hardly a day goes by without them robustly denying, in considerable detail, aspersions and allegations made by Rohingya speakers and UN agency representatives against them.

The AA, who are de facto in control of the administration of 14 of Rakhine State’s 17 townships, were not the only ones not invited to the Conference, though quite obviously they should have been.

Not invited too were the de facto Government of most of Myanmar, with whom most UN Member States maintain diplomatic relations, even if they do not “recognise” the now designated State Security and Peace Commission. (The Myanmar seat at the UN is still occupied by the representative of the former NLD Administration in Myanmar while a war of credentials is pursued.)

Even more surprisingly, delegates elected (after a fashion) at the Rohingya camps were not able to go to New York for reasons possibly connected with their lack of travel documents, so the 1.2 million Rohingya refugees had no serious voice at the Conference, though four young Rohingyas who live in the US were invited to speak, which they did with surprising aplomb and persuasiveness. Why did the Bangladeshi authorities not facilitate the journey of the camp leaders to New York?

Absent too were any representatives from Think Tanks originally invited to speak, such as the International Crisis Group and the Stimson Center. No doubt the prospect of being allowed only 180 seconds (or one page) in which to make a presentation was thought to be quite useless for their purposes. I have no doubt though that the Conference organisers were deluged with materials, such as the persuasive and coherent “Alternative Approach” by the UK’s United Nations Association .

I myself had the temerity to forward The Irrawaddy transcript of Aung Zaw’s first interview with AA’s General Twan Mrat Naing. I noted in my covering email that they would not be represented at the Conference and so would not be able to defend their position. Finally, it is to be noted that only a minority of UN Member States actually spoke at the Conference, and that we therefore do not know what the majority who did not speak might have said. Their reaction to the “action-oriented summary” which the PGA has the unenviable task of preparing is not possible to predict.

While virtually all of those who spoke supported the earliest possible repatriation of the Rohingya, only the veteran diplomat and politician Bob Rae of Canada dared to suggest, in a side-event on 29 September, but not in his plenary statement, that the narrative should have changed long ago from “repatriation” to “resettlement”, for the simply reason that there was nothing to which Rohingya could return: it was just not going to happen. See 01.12.05 at https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1k/k1kqun88pw

In conclusion, there is still much that Bangladesh could do, but it is doubtful that the admirable Dr Yunus Muhammad, as Adviser to the Bangladesh Government, has sufficient influence over the Bangladesh military and intelligence Establishment to rein in their support for militant guerrilla movements like ARSA and the RSO whose camps are located close to the Myanmar-Bangladesh border.

At the time of the 1991-92 exodus of Rohingya to Bangladesh, Western intelligence services identified the RSO and ARIF as responsible for insurgent attacks into Rakhine State from Bangladesh. I found the UK Ministry of Defence (MODUK) intelligence report at this link in our National Archives at Kew, London. Even more intriguing, I also found the diplomatic report from British High Commissioner Colin Imray dated 6 February 1992 at this link disclosing what he had been told by the then Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Mustafizur Rahman. What he may have told Parliament was not exactly true, Mustafizur said, as they had in fact moved insurgent camps to new locations, and they were now under their control.

Why not in 2025 as well? In 2025, the Bangladeshi military and border security authorities know exactly where ARSA and RSO militants are located, and in allowing them to operate into Rakhine State (and in the refugee camps themselves), they are not only condoning but actively supporting their activities. No wonder the AA are less than happy with what they see as Bangladeshi duplicity. Bangladeshi actions in this respect are hardly conducive to peace and stability in Rakhine State. They only delay the day on which Rohingya might finally return home (if ever).

The UN Conference is now behind us. We are once again back in the real world.

Comment by Derek Tonkin on Twitter - 1 October 2025

The Conference highlighted the dire needs of “Rohingya Muslims” both in the camps as well as in Arakan. Funding pledges came particularly from the US and the UK. The US delegate Charles Harder noted in particular:

“To underscore the U.S. commitment in saving lives and providing critical assistance where needed, today I am announcing our intent to provide more than $60 million in assistance for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. With this, we expect meaningful policy changes by Bangladesh to allow livelihood opportunities and by aid organizations to increase cost efficiency.”

In short, refugees in the camps need to be allowed to find work outside.

There was a marked contrast between the ritualistic, almost ideological condemnation of alleged atrocities by the Arakan Army by UN and NGO personnel and the notable absence of any such specific criticism from the representatives of member states. I do not recall that the Arakan Army was once mentioned by any representative, though they would be covered in references to “other armed groups”.

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk was blunt in his aspersions against the Arakan Army, but the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi noted the “recent reconciliatory gestures and a step in the right direction” of Arakan Army actions, and the need to engage with them. Grandi is clearly an “interlocuteur valable” with the Myanmar State and insurgent authorities. Türk is too rigid and hostile.

 It was a tribute to Dr Yunus Muhammad that all five Permanent Representatives of the Security Council sent high level representatives. The presentations by both China and Russia confirmed absolutely no change in their positions. As the UN Press Statement noted:

“Taking a different view, China’s delegate emphasized that ‘for repatriation to truly work’, dialogue between Myanmar and Bangladesh is essential, cautioning against ‘the politicization of human rights issues’ and underscoring the need to respect national sovereignty. The Russian Federation’s representative likewise rejected Western pressure, warned against exploiting the crisis for geopolitical purposes and, instead, underscored the need to create favourable conditions for the implementation of bilateral repatriation agreements.

What happens now, to quote the UN Concept Note, is that: “The President of the General Assembly will prepare a concise and action-oriented summary of the High-level Conference based on the discussion among the participants of the Conference.” There needs to be continuity, but we shall have to wait to see what “action-oriented” endeavours may emerge. It is unlikely that the UK, as pen-holder of the Myanmar dossier in the Security Council, will attempt any far-reaching initiative, in the light of known Chinese and Russian positions, but the dire situation in Myanmar might provide an impetus for China and Russia to be less intransigent.

Dr Yunus Muhammad Urges Urgent Global Action on Rohingya Crisis at UNGA

Arakan Now – 27 September 2025

Dr. Yunus expressed hope that the upcoming high-level conference on September 30 will galvanize global resolve. He urged participants to prioritize diversified and additional funding for the Rohingya response and, in parallel, to agree on a process with time-bound deliverables as part of a globally accepted roadmap toward a permanent solution.

“Bangladesh expects that the conference will generate concrete international support for the Rohingya, with the top-most priority of additional funding,” he concluded.

Comment by Derek Tonkin. Though not previously mentioned in official documentation during the run-up to the Conference, the main, if not only serious aim of the Conference now is to secure vital funding for Rohingya refugees in the camps in Bangladesh. The situation on the ground precludes anything else.

Displacement, Democracy and Development: An Alternative Approach to the Rohingya Refugee Issue

This report represents the findings of a workshop hosted by the organisations UAI and UNA-UK, as summarised by the workshop chairs in consultation with the speakers. September 2025.

Three Key Barriers to Repatriation form Bangladesh

Aung Naing Lin: Global Arakan Network – 27 September 2025

The Arakan Axis: Insurgency intensifies in Southwest Myanmar

Drake Avila: Stimpson Center Brief for The Crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine State Project – 5 June 2025

A year and a half after a sweeping offensive, the Arakan Army is poised to seize control of Rakhine State from Myanmar’s military junta. Its rapid expansion has been enabled by its extensive network across the anti-junta movement. As the Arakan Army solidifies its influence in southwest Myanmar, it now holds the leverage and power to shape the trajectory of the country’s civil war.

The Situation of Rohingya Muslims and other Minorities A/HRC/60/ 20 - 29 August 2025

The latest report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk to the UNGA/HRC

ULA/AA Response to A/HRC/60/20 - 4 September 2025

A strong rebuttal by The United League of Arakan/Arakan Army to the Report of the UNHCHR

UNHCR Grandi calls for increased aid and  funding for Myanmar

UNHCR Press Release - 11 September 2025

The Htan Shauk Khan “Massacre” Controversy

OHCHR v. ULA/AA

OHCHR version

Extract from A/HRC/60/20 “Situation of Human Rights of Rohingya Muslims and other Minorities in Myanmar – 29 August 2025

Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk

“39. In an incident in Htan Shauk Khan village, Buthidaung Township, Rakhine State, on 2 May 2024, in which hundreds of civilian casualties were reported, multiple sources alleged that over 1,000 Rohingya villagers had fled in fear of possible clashes. Witnesses described having been stopped by Arakan Army elements, divided into three groups in paddy fields and fired upon, with the death of scores. One interviewee depicted the scene as “a river of blood. … I saw shooting. I saw mass killing. It was a lot of guns, people were shot in the legs and chest”. Another survivor recounted the killing of 20 relatives, including 3 children.”

ULA/AA Version

Arakan Civil Society Forum – 25 September 2025

The Alleged Htan Shauk Khan Massacre in Buthidaung

“Witnesses consistently reported that around 100 casualties included military junta soldiers, Muslim soldiers of the Junta conscripts, and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and 2 civilian deaths. The Witnesses described the ages, numbers, military equipment, and locations of death bodies, which were verified against existing records. The verified findings against a set of population data of 2023 census, displacement in both nearby settlements of Htan Shauk Kha village and Bangladesh and other supported evidences confirm that the allegation was contradicted, cited by both the witnesses and other respondents, supported by the reported accounts of number of some 100 death bodies of the Junta soldiers found in the village and evidence of abandoned military equipment. They indicated that out of more than 910 individuals as of 2023 census data, the entire displaced population from Htan Shauk Khan village approximately 800 individuals living in villages nearby now, with a few more than 100 individuals having fled to Bangladesh. These figures are inconsistent with the alleged scale of civilian causality. No credible evidence was found to substantiate the alleged claims of 600 civilian individuals massacre of the Htan Shauk Khan village.”

Rethinking Bangladesh's Rohingya Response

Shafiur Rakhman: Counterpoint - 10 September 2025

Bangladesh’s model of Rohingya containment is not a temporary holding pattern - it is politically and economically rewarding for the state. International actors must stop sustaining it. That means recalibrating the cost-benefit equation: confronting the aid-industrial complex, dismantling the fiction of dependency, and building pathways to refugee agency through enforceable rights and economic inclusion. Anything less will simply reproduce the very exclusions we claim to oppose.

That means:

• No more funding without rights. Development finance needs to be tied to concrete gains. Freedom of movement, access to work, education, and legal identity.
• No more secret MOUs. How on earth would that be acceptable to the Rohingya?
• No more parallel systems. Investments need to link refugee well-being to host community prosperity -- not as some kind of charity, but through inclusive planning and shared governance of infrastructure, services, and livelihoods.
• No more empty theatre. Stop staging high profile visits while the real economy is built on refugee exploitation.

Worrying signs of Bangladeshi support for Muslim militants

Twan Mrat Naing Speaks on Rohingya Issue: Arakan Now News – 20 September 2025

Border Guard Bangladesh: Stop Backing RSO and ARSA Terrorists – GAN 19 September 2025

ULA/AA Statement on incursions into Arakan by ARSA and RSO militants – 19 September 2025

Network of Drug Partners: Myanmar Navy, Bangagya [Bengali] Militant Groups – GAN 16 September 2025

"I am delighted to serve with Dignity" : Muslim Officer of Arakha Administration

Global Arakan Network - 10 September 2025

Naw Ji Mulla, Deputy Circle Officer, Buthidaung: "Under the Arakan People’s Government, there are departments like the Auxiliary Police Force (AAP), AAA, AA, and a jury advisory group that includes Muslim elders from Buthidaung and Maungdaw for local consultations. I estimate over 5,000 Muslims work under the government. The majority are in village/ward administration and the AAP, which handles security with armed personnel. To avoid international criticism of Rakhine oppressing Muslims, the AA prioritizes Muslims in village administration and security roles."

Arakan Government reopens Jarma Mosque in Central Maungdaw

Global Arakan Network - 13 September 2025 and Arakan Now News -15 September 2025

The Jarma Mosque (also known as the Monshi Mosque) shut down since 2012 while still under central Myanmar government control, was officially reopened yesterday by the APRG (Arakan People's Revolutionary Government of the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army) as part of its wider efforts "to promote religious freedom, interfaith harmony, and peaceful coexistence in Maungdaw and other conflict-prone areas".

This initiative contrasts with the continuing hostility shown by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and certain international Rohingya activists and INGOs towards the ULA/AA for alleged human rights violations against the Rohingya Muslim minority in Northern Arakan, which has included a very recent petition, in the context of an ongoing "universal jurisdiction" case, to the Argentine authorities by BROUK to issue international arrest warrants against ULA/AA leaders on charges of genocide against the minority.