
Advance unedited version

Distr.: General
20 October 2025

Original: English

Eightieth session

Agenda item 72 (c)

**Promotion and protection of human rights: Human rights situations
and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives**

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar

Note by the Secretary-General*

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General Assembly the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, submitted in accordance to Human Rights Council resolution 52/31.

* The present report was submitted to the conference services for processing after the deadline for technical reasons beyond the control of the submitting office.

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews

Summary

The crisis in Myanmar has reached a critical juncture. The military junta continues its campaign of violence and oppression against the people of Myanmar. Junta forces have continued airstrikes on civilian targets, including schools, clinics, monasteries and displacement camps. Over 100,000 civilian homes have been destroyed in arson attacks. 3.6 million people are displaced, and nearly 22 million require humanitarian assistance.

The junta's callous and opportunistic response to the massive earthquake that struck central Myanmar on 28 March 2025 turned a natural disaster into a humanitarian catastrophe. Junta forces blocked relief efforts in areas outside their control and threatened, harassed and extorted humanitarian workers. Despite declaring a "humanitarian ceasefire," the junta escalated its attacks, launching more airstrikes on civilian targets in the second quarter of 2025 than any previous quarter since the coup.

Having driven Myanmar into a devastating humanitarian and human rights crisis and failed to consolidate control over the country, the junta is making a desperate bid to manufacture a façade of legitimacy by holding sham elections. The polls, which are slated to begin in December, will be neither free nor fair. A free and fair election is not possible when opposition leaders are arrested, detained, tortured or executed; when it is illegal to criticize the junta or the election; when journalists are in prison for having reported the truth.

The people of Myanmar have demonstrated remarkable courage, resilience and determination in their struggle against military dictatorship. They need and deserve the support of the international community. UN Member States and world leaders must denounce the junta's fraudulent election plans for what they are—a sham, take steps to isolate the junta and weaken its ability to attack civilians, and provide robust support for those displaced or otherwise impacted by the coup. Every day of inaction and inertia costs countless lives.

I. Introduction

1. The crisis in Myanmar, largely invisible to most of the world, continues to worsen. Since launching a military coup in 2021, the junta has arrested, jailed, tortured and murdered tens of thousands of people in Myanmar who have openly resisted military rule. Of the nearly 30,000 arrested, more than 22,000 political prisoners remain behind bars.
2. Using sophisticated weapons of war, the junta has been escalating its attacks on civilians. Schools, clinics, monasteries, churches, mosques and the shelters of those displaced by violence have been systematically attacked by military aircraft, artillery and well-armed troops. Over 100,000 civilian homes have been destroyed in arson attacks since the coup, while at least 7,300 have been killed. Meanwhile, 21.9 million require humanitarian assistance and 16.7 million face acute food insecurity.
3. To make matters worse, a devastating earthquake struck central Myanmar on 28 March 2025, impacting an estimated 17 million people and causing nearly \$11 billion in damage. The junta responded by turning a natural disaster into a humanitarian catastrophe. Junta forces blocked the delivery of humanitarian aid in areas outside of their control while threatening, harassing, interrogating and extorting relief workers. After declaring a “humanitarian ceasefire,” the junta proceeded to escalate its attacks on civilians, launching more airstrikes on civilian targets in the second quarter of 2025 than any previous quarter since the coup.
4. Now, more than ever, it is imperative that Member States of the United Nations address the root causes of violence and human suffering in Myanmar by taking steps to reduce the military junta’s capacity to commit gross human rights violations while addressing the deepening humanitarian crisis in the country.
5. There are three things that the junta needs to sustain itself and its assaults on the people of Myanmar: money, weapons and legitimacy.
6. The good news is that some governments and private institutions have taken effective action to deny the junta access to money and weapons linked to war crimes and crimes against humanity. Following a government investigation into the transfer of weapons and weapons materials from Singapore to the junta, for example, the volume of weapons-related transfers from Singapore dropped by 90 percent. Overall, international weapons transfers to the junta decreased by over a third. Bangkok Bank reported to the Special Rapporteur that it had terminated its banking relationship with Myanma Economic Bank, the key junta-controlled bank used to purchase weapons and related materials. Sanctions imposed on financial institutions by the United States in 2023 seriously disrupted military supply chains and revenue flows.
7. The bad news is that despite their effectiveness, progress on sanctions targeting the junta and its allies has stalled. Governments have been unwilling to join Canada in imposing sanctions on Myanma Economic Bank, the junta-controlled bank that is now its principal vehicle for military procurement. Member States have yet to impose sanctions on the newly constituted State Security and Peace Commission, the junta’s latest manifestation.
8. As it escalates its military operations, the junta is seeking international legitimacy by orchestrating a fraudulent general election beginning 28 December. No self-respecting democratic government or leader would accept this exercise as anything other than what it will be, a sham. A free and fair election is not possible when opposition leaders are arrested, detained, tortured or executed; when it is illegal to criticize the junta or the election; when journalists are in prison for having reported the truth. While enormous pressure will be exerted on individuals to cast ballots, few in Myanmar will accept a blatantly rigged, illegitimate election or its outcome. Violence is very likely to spike during the election period and beyond.
9. The critical question is whether the international community will accept or reject this fraudulent exercise orchestrated by an illegitimate regime. Unfortunately, too few Member States have taken a clear, public position.

10. In the meantime, the international community has failed to come up with the funding required to address a deepening humanitarian crisis. In April 2025, the World Food Program was forced to cut food assistance to over one million people in Myanmar. Underfunding has led to the closure of at least 65 health care facilities serving over 200,000 people. As of September 2025, the UN's baseline pre-earthquake humanitarian aid plan was only 12 percent funded. Without new funding, food assistance for more than one million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh could end completely next year.

11. In Rakhine State, civilians are trapped in a vortex of violence and oppression. All parties to the conflict in Rakhine State—the military, Rohingya militants and the Arakan Army—have been accused of grave human rights abuses against the civilian population. More than 150,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh in 2024 and 2025. Ethnic Rakhine escaping escalating violence have also crossed the border.

12. In a rare piece of good news, the Government of Thailand responded to sweeping funding cuts by allowing residents of refugee camps along its border with Myanmar to work for Thai employers, providing a vital lifeline to a population affected by rations cuts. The interim government of Bangladesh has announced, however, that Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh will not similarly be allowed livelihood opportunities. Studies have shown refugees, when given the chance to work, contribute positively to local economies by filling labor gaps, creating businesses, and generating long-term growth benefits for host communities.¹

13. International action to address the crisis in Myanmar has proven to be effective. It works. This fact underscores the Special Rapporteur's frustration and deep concern with flagging support for coordinated international action on the crisis in Myanmar.

14. For much of the world, Myanmar, and refugees from Myanmar in neighboring countries, are out of sight, out of mind.

15. States have not built on the momentum created by the sanctioning of key junta-controlled banks. They have not developed a coordinated plan to isolate the junta and constrain its ability to attack and oppress the people of Myanmar, including by increasing sanctions that deny the junta the weapons of war that it uses to attack civilians. States have failed to provide the level of resources necessary to avert a grave humanitarian catastrophe. With some notable exceptions, States have failed to adequately engage, support and empower the organizations and institutions that are building the foundation for a democratic and right-respecting Myanmar.

16. Myanmar is at a critical juncture. Its people have demonstrated remarkable courage, resilience and determination to address a deepening crisis and realize a democratic, human rights respecting future for their children. To be successful, they need and deserve the support of the international community.

17. Why is the trajectory of international engagement and support moving downward, even as the crisis in Myanmar spikes upward? An inescapable factor is the political headwinds that are eroding support for human rights and decency around the world. These headwinds are being driven by the deployment of fear, grievance and xenophobia as political weapons. Myanmar offers a painful example of the consequence of these forces for people bearing the brunt of armed conflict, oppression and a deepening humanitarian crisis.

18. Reversing this downward trajectory will require a stronger level of support from the international community, which will in turn require a stronger level of public support for those governments and leaders who are committed to the rights, dignity and quality of life of all people. The case for human rights needs to be made in the face of a barrage of attacks

¹ See, UNHCR, "The Economic Case for Welcoming Refugees," March 2025, <https://www.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/the-economic-case-for-welcoming-refugees-fact-sheet.pdf>; The World Bank, "Refugee Employment: Perspectives for Businesses, Policymakers, and Intermediaries," 14 June 2024, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/private-sector-for-refugees/brief/refugee-employment>; Deloitte and UNHCR, "Analysis of the impact of refugees from Ukraine on the economy of Poland," 2nd edition, June 2025, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/116621>.

against decency and humanitarian aid, attacks on the principles and values that are the foundation of the United Nations. This is a task, an obligation, for all of us who believe that our children and grandchildren deserve to live in a peaceful, rights-respecting world; a world where the rights, dignity and quality of life of people matter, no matter where they live; a world where the rule of law and human decency prevail over xenophobia, violence and bigotry.

19. Now, more than ever, it is time for all of us to stand up for the human rights of the people of Myanmar and around the world. The stakes could not be higher.

II. Desperately seeking legitimacy: The junta prepares for fraudulent elections

20. An immediate, meaningful action that the international community can take to support the people of Myanmar is to unequivocally reject and denounce the charade the junta is presenting as an “election.”

21. On 31 July 2025, the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), a military-controlled body, lifted a nationwide state of emergency that had been in place since the 2021 military coup. At the same time, the NDSC dissolved the State Administration Council (SAC), the military’s ruling body, and replaced it with the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC), a new body comprised of current and former generals. The SSPC was tasked with overseeing the junta’s plans to hold fraudulent elections, until which time it will exercise legislative, executive and judicial powers.

22. The actions of 31 July are mere cosmetic changes to reposition the junta ahead of its election ploy. They do not signal political change in Myanmar but only underscore the military’s unwillingness to countenance political dialog or reconciliation with pro-democracy forces. Tellingly, coup-leader and commander-in-chief of Myanmar’s armed forces Senior General Min Aung Hlaing sits at the head of all three bodies linked to the 31 July events: the NDSC, SAC and SSPC. Seven of the SSPC’s ten members are former members of the SAC.

23. While announcing its new incarnation, the junta reaffirmed its plans to hold a “multiparty democratic general election.” The junta subsequently announced that the election will begin on 28 December with voting in 102 of Myanmar’s 330 townships and continue into January 2026. The junta’s assertion that the election will be “democratic” is preposterous, and its plan to hold polling while it attacks and oppresses the people of Myanmar is dangerous and destabilizing.

24. The junta’s relentless attacks on political opponents and fundamental freedoms have created an environment in which a free and fair election is impossible. Former State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi and many other key political leaders remain behind bars. Many of the more than 22,000 political prisoners in the country are former politicians, members of political parties or political activists. The junta has criminalized freedom of expression, locking up journalists and human rights defenders who report on the junta’s actions and abuses. It has dissolved at least 40 political parties, including the National League for Democracy, which won landslide victories in the last two general elections.

25. Seeking to maximize its electoral advantages, the junta has manipulated Myanmar’s legal framework and electoral system. The elections will use a mixed first-past-the-post and proportional representation system. The junta may be calculating that the introduction of proportional allocation of seats could help prevent a landslide opposition victory such as the NLD’s in 2015 and 2020 and increase the power of military-appointed MPs in a divided Parliament.

26. In January 2023, the junta adopted the Political Parties Registration Law, which replaced a previous electoral law. The new law imposes restrictive registration requirements, bars those convicted of crimes from joining political parties, and disqualifies individuals or parties associated with junta-designated “terrorist organizations.” Together, these provisions effectively purged the National League for Democracy, its leadership, and many other credible opposition parties and politicians from the political sphere. A July 2025 amendment to the law allows for the dissolution of parties accused of electoral fraud, the pretext that the military used—without providing evidence—for staging the coup after the 2020 elections.

27. In July 2025, the junta adopted the Law on the Protection of Multiparty Democratic General Elections from Obstruction, Disruption, and Destruction, which imposes penalties of up to 10 years' imprisonment for disrupting elections through public speeches, protests, written materials or threats. By the end of September 2025, the junta had filed charges against at least 64 people under the law. Myanmar's new Cybersecurity Law, which was passed in January 2025, consolidates many of the most restrictive elements of the junta's policies concerning digital rights. The law bans usage of virtual private networks (VPNs), creates new crimes relating to online expression, and allows junta authorities to suspend or close digital platforms. These laws, as well as the junta's amendments to Myanmar's legal code following the coup, foreclose the possibility of open political discourse in the lead-up to the election.

28. Notwithstanding these concerns, the junta clearly lacks the capacity to pull off a nationwide general election. According to the junta itself, the "census" operation it performed in late 2024 was only "successfully carried out" in 145 of 330 townships. The junta was forced to "estimate" a population of more than 19 million in areas beyond its reach. In the intervening months, the political and security environment has only become less conducive to elections as opposition offensives and junta counter-offensives continue to rage across the country. The junta has already effectively admitted its inability to administer a nationwide general election by announcing that no polls will be held in dozens of townships.

29. Elections held on the junta's terms will only deepen division and fuel further violence in the country. The National League for Democracy, National Unity Government, ethnic resistance organizations, regional governance bodies and civil society organizations have all condemned the junta's election plans. Some armed groups have stated that they will prevent polling in areas under their control. Others have threatened violence against individuals and groups involved in administering the election.

30. The people of Myanmar are well aware of the violence, coercion and exclusion that underpin the junta's election plans and will overwhelmingly reject the results as illegitimate. However, the junta's primary audience for this electoral exercise is not the domestic population but foreign governments, which it hopes will overlook the obvious facts on the ground, recognize the "victory" of junta-backed parties, and legitimize a military-controlled government.

31. On the sidelines of an ASEAN summit in July, Malaysia's Foreign Minister said that ASEAN ministers "advised Myanmar that an election is not a priority for now, the priority is to cease all violence... so that all parties can sit together." He continued, "There's no point in having a partial election. That will not solve any problems, but instead will worsen conditions." After the junta lifted the nationwide state of emergency, Japan's foreign minister said that Japan was "seriously concerned" about the junta's election plans, which "could only provoke further strong backlash from the people of Myanmar and make a peaceful resolution more difficult." UN officials and several Member States rejected the junta's election scheme when addressing the UN General Assembly's High-Level Conference on Rohingya Muslims and other Minorities in Myanmar in September.

32. Other governments' positions in relation to the junta's planned election are more ambiguous. In August, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing met Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Tianjin. According to a readout from India's Ministry of External Affairs, the Prime Minister "expressed the hope that the forthcoming elections in Myanmar will be held in a fair and inclusive manner involving all stakeholders." It is abundantly clear that the junta has engineered the election to be neither fair nor inclusive. Myanmar state media separately reported that India plans to send "electoral observation teams" to Myanmar.

III. Junta compounds suffering from devastating earthquake

33. On 28 March 2025, a massive 7.7 magnitude earthquake struck central Myanmar, with an epicenter 19 kilometers northwest of Mandalay. According to official statistics, approximately 3,700 were killed by the tremor. Tallies by independent media outlets indicated that over 5,000 died. Given the state of armed conflict, displacement and communications disruptions throughout the country, the true number of those killed is likely much higher, and these figures do not include the unknown number of people who have died

because of the secondary impacts of the earthquake, like disease and hunger, and the junta's cruel and self-serving response to the disaster.

34. The earthquake damaged over 157,000 buildings and left approximately 200,000 people homeless. Schools, hospitals and religious and government buildings were among the structures that were severely damaged. An estimated 17 million people were impacted.

35. Many of those whose homes were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable by the quake ended up sheltering in streets and open spaces, with scant shelter or support. With the earthquake falling in the middle of Myanmar's hot season, they faced soaring temperatures and, as the monsoon began, drenching rains and floods. The earthquake severely damaged water and sanitation infrastructure, and many experienced shortages of clean water for drinking and hygiene. The earthquake disrupted harvests and damaged irrigation systems, further threatening food security. The World Bank estimated that the earthquake caused nearly US\$11 billion in damage to physical assets and will result in a further US\$2.6 billion in lost output over the following year, driving up poverty and household vulnerability.

36. The junta turned a natural disaster into a humanitarian catastrophe by seeking to turn the earthquake to its own advantage as it obstructed the delivery of humanitarian aid.

37. Following the earthquake, the junta activated the Natural Disaster Management Law, requiring that all humanitarian relief efforts be coordinated with a junta-controlled body. It also required that all organizations involved in aiding earthquake-impacted communities comply with the onerous and intrusive registration and reporting requirements set out in the draconian Organization Registration Law.

38. Relief teams, including those from foreign countries, were forced to obtain permission from junta administrators before being allowed to deliver aid or conduct search and rescue operations. Permission was systematically denied for relief efforts in areas outside of the junta's control. Journalists were also barred from reporting from earthquake-impacted areas.

39. These restrictions were enforced at checkpoints manned by junta soldiers and allied militias. Relief workers were often threatened, harassed, interrogated and extorted at these checkpoints. Junta security forces confiscated medical supplies destined for communities impacted by the earthquake or armed conflict. Junta soldiers reportedly looted the homes of families displaced by the earthquake. Youth involved in relief efforts were also reportedly rounded up and used for forced labor or conscripted into military service.

IV. Escalating attacks on civilians

40. Soon after the earthquake, armed groups rapidly declared unilateral ceasefires to facilitate search, rescue and relief efforts. The day after the quake, the National Unity Government announced a "two-week pause in offensive military operations." A few days later, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, a grouping of three armed groups operating in northern Shan State, announced a "one-month Unilateral Humanitarian Pause." On 2 April, the junta followed suit, declaring a "temporary ceasefire period" running until 22 April. The Kachin Independence Army declared a similar pause in military operations.

41. Despite its ceasefire announcement, the junta increased its attacks on civilians in the weeks immediately following the earthquake. Myanmar Witness recorded 50 aerial attacks in the two weeks before the ceasefire and 67 in the two weeks following.² Sagaing and Mandalay Regions, the two regions most affected by the earthquake, saw the highest number of aerial attacks in the two weeks following the ceasefire.

42. According to data from Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), there were more military airplane and drone strikes on civilian targets in April than in any other month in the first half of 2025.³ The second quarter of 2025 saw more airstrikes on civilian targets than any previous quarter since the coup.

² Myanmar Witness, "Ceasefire in name only: Reported aerial attacks continue after Myanmar's earthquake truce," 6 August 2025, <https://www.info-res.org/myanmar-witness/reports/ceasefire-in-name-only-reported-aerial-attacks-continue-after-myanmars-earthquake-truce/>.

³ Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, Data Export Tool (accessed 18 August 2025).

43. On 12 May, 22 students and two teachers were reportedly killed in an airstrike on a school in O Htein Twin village, Sagaing Region. Over 100 others were injured. Witnesses reported that cluster bombs were used in the attack and that there were no combatants or active conflict in the area at the time. At least 10 civilians were reportedly killed in an airstrike that hit a wedding in Kyunki village, Bago Region on 25 May. The bride was among the deceased. A nighttime airstrike on a Sagaing Region monastery where displaced people were sheltering reportedly killed at least 23 people, including four children, on 11 July. On 17 August, at least 25 civilians, including children, were reportedly killed by a junta airstrike on Mawchi, Kayah State.

44. On 6 October, the Buddhist Thadingyut holiday, at least 24 civilians were reportedly killed when a motorized military paraglider dropped bombs on a candlelight vigil for political prisoners in Sagaing Region. The Special Rapporteur spoke with a man whose leg was injured in the attack. He described the scene after two bombs were dropped in short succession, leaving scores with shrapnel wounds:

We were chanting when the bomb dropped. I realized that I was hit by some shrapnel. I tried to crawl like a crocodile and dragged myself into a ditch... Most of the people who were standing fell down. ... The situation was totally chaotic. ... The place was totally dark. People were shouting for help and screaming in panic.

45. A few hours later, a paraglider dropped more bombs on the site of the first attack. Junta forces reportedly shelled one of the clinics treating victims a few days later.

46. Junta forces have continued to carry out arson attacks on villages and other civilian sites in the months since the earthquake. Over 100,000 civilian homes have reportedly been destroyed in arson attacks since the coup. The Special Rapporteur also continues to receive reports of sexual violence perpetrated by junta soldiers, including gang rape. Soldiers reportedly raped up to 25 women during raids on villages in Kanbalu Township, Sagaing Region, in June 2025.

47. Anti-junta armed groups, including People's Defense Forces and ethnic resistance organizations, have also been accused of grave abuses against civilians, including killings, torture and sexual violence. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has recorded 169 killings of junta administrators, their family members and other civilians by anti-military groups, including People's Defense Forces.

48. Opposition armed groups, including some People's Defense Forces, have reportedly been forcibly recruiting civilians in areas they control. Armed groups often demand that families or communities provide a certain number of recruits or face consequences, including violence or detention. If recruits are not offered up voluntarily, some groups reportedly abduct young men to meet quotas. These groups have at times imposed recruitment demands on ethnic communities other than their own in areas that they have recently occupied.

49. The Special Rapporteur spoke with a Myanmar citizen of Nepali descent from Mogoke, Mandalay Region, a town that was captured by the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) in 2024. Earlier this year, the TNLA arrested Nepali community leaders after they rejected the TNLA's request to form a Nepali "town guard force" under its command. The man described how the TNLA has carried out the forced recruitment drive:

The TNLA has a policy: If a family member has three sons, they must give one for recruitment. If we don't provide [recruits], they said they will arrest most of our community members. They threaten us like this. They are targeting our Nepali community. It is obvious because when we go around town, the TNLA stops our motorcycles and asks our ethnicity. If you are Nepali, they take you away. If you are Burmese or another ethnicity, they let you go.

50. He described how children as young as 13 or 14 have been detained by the TNLA.

V. Violence against Rohingya and Rakhine civilians

51. In Rakhine State, where the Arakan Army is battling junta forces and Rohingya armed groups, civilians are trapped in a vortex of violence and oppression. All parties to the conflict stand accused of committing grave human rights abuses against civilian populations. Desperate Rohingya families are again crossing the border in large numbers, with

approximately 150,000 having arrived in refugee camps in Bangladesh in 2024 and 2025. Ethnic Rakhine have also begun to cross the border to escape the violence.

52. As it has done in opposition-controlled areas throughout the country, the junta has repeatedly attacked civilian populations in Rakhine State, killing and displacing both Rohingya and ethnic Rakhine people. In May 2024, soldiers massacred approximately 90 Rakhine villagers in Byain Phyu village near Sittwe, reportedly torturing the victims before killing them and gang-raping women. In January 2025, a military airstrike on Ramree Island, which is controlled by the Arakan Army, reportedly killed up to 40 civilians, including many women and children. Also that month, an airstrike on a crowded marketplace in Kyuaktaw, also controlled by the Arakan Army, killed around a dozen civilians. Junta jets pounded Arakan Army-controlled villages and towns in the weeks following the March earthquake, despite the junta's declared "ceasefire".

53. Junta forces have also burned Rakhine villages and Rakhine wards of larger towns, including Buthidaung. Soldiers have used civilians as human shields, establishing bases in camps for internally displaced people and the compounds of humanitarian organizations. Junta forces have confiscated aid and set fire to humanitarian facilities, including a World Food Programme warehouse holding 1,175 metric tons of food aid.

54. Junta forces have forcibly recruited thousands of Rohingya men and boys, many of whom have been deployed to the frontlines of the fight against the Arakan Army or used as human shields. Rohingya recruits have also been ordered to attack Rakhine civilian populations and destroy Rakhine property, escalating tensions between Rakhine and Rohingya populations.

55. In the past two years, Rohingya armed groups—notably the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO)—have joined in the fight against the Arakan Army, at times directly coordinating with or assisting junta forces. With a rear base in refugee camps in Bangladesh, these groups exploit, oppress and attack Rohingya civilians on both sides of the border.

56. ARSA and RSO have forcibly recruited Rohingya men and boys in the refugee camps in Bangladesh and deployed them to fight in Rakhine State. In many cases, youth have been abducted and forced across the border without recourse. In some cases, Rohingya militant groups have handed over or "sold" recruits directly to junta forces.

57. Rohingya militants have killed scores of Rohingya refugees in the camps in Bangladesh in recent years, including community and religious leaders, teachers and human rights defenders. An agreement between Rohingya armed groups reached in late 2024 reduced armed clashes between the groups but increased their control over the camp population. Abductions and kidnapping for ransom have reportedly increased since the agreement was concluded.

58. Inside Rakhine State, ARSA and RSO continue to attack the Arakan Army, commit atrocities against Rakhine civilians, and exploit the Rohingya community. Rohingya militants have reportedly been involved in the burning of hundreds or thousands of homes of ethnic Rakhine people. They have also been implicated in the killing of Rakhine civilians, including brutal executions.

59. ARSA and RSO attacks on Rakhine civilians increase the risk of retaliatory attacks by the Arakan Army that endanger Rohingya civilians.

60. Notwithstanding the abuses and exploitative actions of Rohingya armed groups, the Arakan Army itself has been implicated in grave human rights abuses, including arbitrary detention, torture, killings and arson attacks.

61. Rohingya eyewitnesses described widespread and indiscriminate violence by the Arakan Army during its successful offensive to wrest control of northern Rakhine State from the junta in mid-2024. UN investigators reported that Arakan Army soldiers killed "scores" of Rohingya civilians from Htan Shauk Khan in Buthidaung Township in May 2024. Rohingya advocates have suggested far higher numbers of victims. Arakan Army spokespersons have vehemently denied responsibility for the killings, suggesting that images of the purported victims show the bodies of junta soldiers, not Rohingya civilians.

62. Also in May 2024, the Arakan Army reportedly burned Rohingya wards of Buthidaung town after junta forces fled. The destruction of large parts of Buthidaung town

has been confirmed by satellite imagery analysis that strongly suggests the Arakan Army's responsibility. According to Rohingya eyewitnesses, Arakan Army soldiers fired on residents as they fled and set alight homes while inhabitants were still inside. Rohingya civilians told the Special Rapporteur that they saw scores or hundreds of dead bodies as they fled Buthidaung in May 2024.

63. In June 2024, the Arakan Army ordered civilians to evacuate Maungdaw town in advance of its attack on junta forces in the city. Rohingya eyewitnesses told the Special Rapporteur that they were targeted in drone strikes and ground attacks as the Arakan Army battled the military and Rohingya armed groups in the area in the weeks that followed.

64. In August 2024, over 100 Rohingya civilians were killed during a drone attack on a beach on the Naf River, where they had fled to avoid attacks by the Arakan Army. Rohingya eyewitnesses said that the attack involved drones that appeared to come from the direction of Arakan Army positions near Maungdaw. The Special Rapporteur spoke to several Rohingya who lost friends or family members in the attack.

65. The number of drone strikes and other attacks on civilians has declined significantly since the Arakan Army drove junta forces from Buthidaung and Maungdaw in 2024 and established control of all of northern Rakhine State. Fewer massacres and arson attacks have been reported in 2025 than in the previous year. However, alongside its efforts to combat the Rohingya insurgency, the Arakan Army has reportedly abducted large numbers of Rohingya civilians, predominantly young men. Some have reportedly been forced to carry out military duties or provide labor to the Arakan Army, have been used as human shields in military operations, or have simply disappeared.

66. In August 2025, the Special Rapporteur spoke with new arrivals to the refugee camps in Bangladesh. Many told the Special Rapporteur about family and community members who had been taken by the Arakan Army and whose whereabouts and condition remain unknown. Rohingya men who have escaped Arakan Army custody have described severe deprivation and brutal torture. Some detainees have reportedly been executed and beheaded.

67. There are reports that Arakan Army officers threatened or coerced Rohingya civilians to leave Rakhine State for Bangladesh, with many forced to pay fees to the Arakan Army to facilitate their travel to Bangladesh. Some Rohingya who returned from Bangladesh have reportedly been arrested and detained.

68. Rohingya who remain in Rakhine State reportedly suffer severe movement and livelihood restrictions imposed by the Arakan Army, including confinement in displacement camps. Those seeking to travel must reportedly pay a fee and obtain permission from Arakan Army officials. Many have allegedly been prevented from fishing or farming, contributing to severe food shortages. Restrictions appear to be most severe in areas of northern Rakhine State where Rohingya militants have operated. At the same time, Rohingya civilians who live in parts of central Rakhine State that are under the control of the Arakan Army report fewer restrictions.

69. Given the grave threats in Rakhine State, approximately 150,000 Rohingya refugees have fled to Bangladesh in 2024 and 2025.

70. The Special Rapporteur has spoken multiple times with the leadership of the Arakan Army, including Senior General Twan Mrat Naing. The Senior General vehemently denied the Arakan Army's responsibility for abuses alleged by Rohingya advocates and human rights organizations and raised concerns that the Arakan Army is being "smeared" using unverified and fabricated information. He has invited the Special Rapporteur to investigate accusations of human rights abuses, including by visiting the site of the alleged massacre in Htan Shauk Khan village.

71. The Special Rapporteur has not been able to independently verify the facts relating to specific events in Rakhine State. He has spoken to dozens of Rohingya people, however, whose accounts are consistent with the accusations made by UN investigators, human rights organizations and Rohingya advocates. Given the security situation in Rakhine State and telecommunications restrictions, collecting evidence concerning the situation in Rakhine State is extremely difficult. Even organizations with networks in Rakhine State admit having scant information about the situation on the ground. An independent, credible investigation of abuses committed by all parties to the conflict in Rakhine State is essential.

VI. Deepening humanitarian crisis and cuts to foreign aid

72. Myanmar faces a spiraling humanitarian crisis driven by armed conflict and the junta's purposeful obstruction of humanitarian relief efforts. The devastating conditions in the country have been exacerbated by severe funding cuts.

73. Approximately 3.6 million people have been displaced by armed conflict and human rights violations in Myanmar. At the beginning of 2025, the UN estimated that 19.9 million people required humanitarian assistance, a figure that increased to 21.9 million following the earthquake in March.

74. In the first eight months of 2025, the UN reported 649 "access-related incidents," including military operations, administrative restrictions as well as threats and violence against humanitarian actors and infrastructure. The junta has regularly withheld approval for humanitarian operations, leading to the suspension of planned relief activities. Junta officials in many areas have arbitrarily imposed new regulations and requirements on civil society and humanitarian organization, adding to the thicket of bureaucratic red tape that delays and obstructs the delivery of aid. Roadblocks and checkpoints continue to be a significant impediment to humanitarian relief efforts.

75. Many families in Myanmar struggle to put food on their table. In addition to obstructing aid deliveries, the junta has systematically restricted livelihoods, disrupted agriculture and destroyed food stores and agricultural infrastructure. Landmine contamination has also been a major impediment to food production. The junta has often planted landmines in farm fields and agricultural areas, leaving many villagers fearful of returning to their fields and harvesting their crops. Severe flooding during the rainy season submerged farmland, destroyed crops, killed livestock and damaged agricultural infrastructure. 16.7 million people now face acute food insecurity.

76. The food crisis is most severe in Rakhine State, where the UN has warned of famine and hundreds of thousands face starvation. By restricting land and sea transportation, the junta has imposed a blockade on aid deliveries and trade into areas of Rakhine State controlled by the Arakan Army. According to a survey by the World Food Programme, 57 percent of families in central Rakhine State cannot meet their basic food needs. This marks a dramatic and rapid increase from the 33 percent that reported similar food challenges in December 2024. The situation in northern Rakhine State, where communications and movement restrictions make data collection near impossible, is likely significantly worse.

77. The dire food situation in Rakhine State has led families to adopt dangerous and desperate coping strategies, including taking on new debt, scavenging for food, withdrawing children from school in order to work and engaging smuggling networks. Domestic violence and human trafficking are on the rise. Severe hunger has reportedly led to a dramatic rise in suicides in Rakhine State.

78. For four years the junta has attacked health care workers and infrastructure, leading to predictably dire health conditions for the people of Myanmar. In the first eight months of 2025, researchers recorded 169 attacks on health care, including attacks on medical facilities and the killing, kidnapping and arrest of health workers. The junta has systematically restricted the importation and distribution of medicines, including antiretroviral therapy drugs for HIV-positive persons. Health care workers and humanitarian organizations have reported outbreaks of malaria, acute watery diarrhea, other waterborne diseases and skin infections in many parts of the country, especially among displaced populations.

79. The humanitarian response in Myanmar continues to be dreadfully underfunded. Global reductions to humanitarian funding led the UN to implement a "Humanitarian Reset" in mid-2025 involving the "hyper-prioritizing" of humanitarian aid plans to focus resources on the most vulnerable populations. Myanmar's re-prioritized plan for 2025 cut the number of people targeted with humanitarian aid from 6.7 million to 4.8 million, a total that is less than a quarter of the 21.9 million in need of humanitarian assistance. As of early-October 2025, the UN's baseline humanitarian appeal for Myanmar was only 13 percent funded.

80. In April 2025, inadequate funding forced the World Food Programme (WFP) to cut food assistance to over one million people in Myanmar. These cuts impacted 100,000 displaced people in central Rakhine State whose only source of food was WFP aid. Underfunding has led to the closure of at least 65 health facilities serving over 212,000

people. Many health workers have stopped receiving their salaries, though some continue to work in exchange for in-kind benefits, such as food items.

VII. The situation of refugees from Myanmar

81. According to UNHCR there are over 1.5 million refugees and asylum seekers from Myanmar present in Bangladesh, Malaysia, India, Thailand and Indonesia. This figure does not include millions of others from Myanmar who reside abroad under other legal frameworks—such as those available to migrant workers—or who have had no contact with UNHCR, many of whom meet the definition of refugees under international law.

82. As the Special Rapporteur has highlighted in previous reports, many refugees from Myanmar face human rights violations and serious threats to their health, safety and wellbeing in their host countries.⁴ Some governments have prevented UNHCR from contacting new arrivals, limited access to education and livelihood opportunities, obstructed resettlement to third countries, and arrested, detained and extorted refugees and migrants from Myanmar. Some of Myanmar's neighbors have violated the principle of non-refoulement by pushing back refugees at their borders and deporting people to Myanmar despite the risk they will face violence and oppression. Regional governments have failed to mount an effective response to the perilous boat journeys taken by Rohingya refugees and others, leading to hundreds of preventable deaths at sea.

83. Meanwhile, the international community, including countries with significant capacity, have failed to do their part in addressing the global refugee crisis or the situation of refugees from Myanmar. Inadequate funding and paltry refugee resettlement quotas put refugees from Myanmar and the countries that host them in precarious circumstances.

84. The situation for refugees from Myanmar, already dire, took a dramatic turn for the worse in 2025 when the United States government announced severe funding cuts that devastated programs supporting refugees from Myanmar. In 2024, the United States provided 55 percent of the funding for the Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis Joint Response Plan, the primary vehicle for support to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. As of early-October 2025, the Joint Response Plan was only 38 percent funded.

85. The dire funding situation has already led to the suspension of key services for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, with the threat of more severe cuts looming on the horizon. In order to maximize the impact of waning support, UN agencies have slashed administrative budgets and made dramatic staff cuts. Rohingya “volunteers,” who received stipends from humanitarian agencies, have been let go, cutting off a vital source of income for many refugee families. UNICEF education programs have been severely curtailed because of a lack of funding, leaving children idle and threatening their development and future prospects. Medical services, mental health care, programs on gender-based violence, camp maintenance activities, and services for persons with disabilities have also experienced cuts.

86. In September, the President of the UN General Assembly convened a High-Level Conference on the Situation of Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar. The conference drew attention to the crisis in Rakhine State and the lack of adequate support for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. During the conference Member States highlighted their contributions to humanitarian assistance for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, and several made new funding commitments, including a \$60 million commitment from the United States.

87. These new contributions appear to have extended the funding pipeline for food assistance for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, which was previously forecasted to end in December 2025. Still, without fresh funding commitments, rations for Rohingya could be terminated in 2026, a potential doomsday scenario for refugees. Given the Bangladesh government's restrictions on refugee movement and livelihoods, Rohingya in Bangladesh are almost completely dependent on rations for survival.

88. The Bangladesh government has consistently emphasized its chief objective of facilitating Rohingya refugees' return to their homeland in Rakhine State, a goal shared by

⁴ See, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, UN Doc. No. A/HRC/52/66, 9 March 2023.

the Rohingya themselves. However, it is clear that the current situation in Rakhine State is not conducive to the safe, dignified and voluntary return of Rohingya refugees. At the conference in New York, Rohingya representatives described the conditions necessary for their return to Rakhine State, including the restoration of citizenship, the return of their land and property, respect for fundamental human rights, and guarantees of safety. None of these conditions exist.

89. Funding cuts have similarly impacted support for the more than 100,000 refugees from Myanmar who live in camps in Thailand. In the first half of 2025, inadequate funding led to rations reductions and the suspension or disruption of medical, mental health, protection, water and sanitation programs. The United States government's decision to end most refugee resettlement through its U.S. Refugee Admissions Program also impacted refugees in Thailand, some of whom had already been approved for resettlement and were awaiting their dates of departure.

90. In July, a lack of funding forced The Border Consortium—the organization coordinating services for residents of refugee camps along the Thailand-Myanmar border—to suspend rations distribution to more than 80 percent of camp residents, preserving rations only for the most vulnerable households. In September, the United States government renewed a grant that restores rations through the end of the year, but the grant is not expected to be extended further.

91. In August, the Thai government adopted a resolution allowing a majority of camp-based refugees to work outside the camps. The new policy, which involves registration with Thai authorities and safeguards against the exploitation of refugee laborers, went into effect in October, offering a vital lifeline to refugee families.

92. Following the April 2025 terrorist attack on Hindu tourists in Jammu and Kashmir, refugees from Myanmar have been under severe pressure in India even though no individuals from Myanmar were involved in the attack. Refugees in India told the Special Rapporteur that they have been summoned, detained, interrogated and threatened with deportation by Indian authorities in recent months.

93. In early May 2025, approximately 40 Rohingya refugees, including women and children, were detained in Delhi, flown on Indian military aircraft to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and transferred to an Indian navy vessel. The refugees, who reportedly held refugee identification documents, were interrogated, threatened and severely beaten as the ship carried them across the Andaman Sea. The group was then given life jackets and forced into the sea just off Myanmar's coast. They reportedly received protection from an anti-junta armed group upon reaching shore. Indian authorities also deported scores of Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh in May. The Special Rapporteur has written to the Indian government concerning these deportations and met with government officials who pledged to report back after investigating these events. The Special Rapporteur continues to wait for this report.

VIII. State action to isolate the junta

94. The Special Rapporteur has repeatedly called on states to take actions that deprive the junta of weapons, money and legitimacy. He has reported extensively on important steps that governments have taken to this end: sanctioning arms dealing networks that supply the junta; cutting off the junta's access to the international finance system; curtailing diplomatic engagements with the junta. These actions have disrupted military supply chains and isolated the junta on the international stage. The Special Rapporteur has also reported, however, on the actions of governments that continue to engage and empower Myanmar's generals, calling on them to end material and diplomatic support to the junta.

95. As the Special Rapporteur has previously reported, sanctions have been among the most effective tools in disrupting the junta's ability to acquire weapons and weapons materials used in attacks on civilians, as well as the funds needed to purchase those weapons and supplies. In particular, sanctions imposed by the United States on the junta-controlled Myanma Foreign Trade Bank in mid-2023 have seriously disrupted military supply chains

and revenue streams.⁵ The Special Rapporteur has also lauded the actions of governments—notably Singapore’s—to crack down on arms dealing networks supplying the junta.

96. The international community, unfortunately, has failed to build on the momentum created by these actions. Only the United States and Canada have added new sanctions in 2025. New US sanctions focus on entities involved in cyberscam operations in Myanmar’s border regions and entities facilitating weapons deals with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. These actions, while important, do not strike at the heart of the junta’s attacks on civilians and oppression of the people of Myanmar. Notably, no government has added new sanctions against Myanma Economic Bank,⁶ the junta-controlled bank that became the junta’s primary vehicle for military procurement and repatriating foreign revenues since the United States sanctioned Myanma Foreign Trade Bank.

97. The Special Rapporteur is concerned that governments that have heretofore been allies in efforts to isolate the junta are backing away from their previous commitments or deprioritizing support for the people of Myanmar. While the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, Canada and Australia have all sanctioned the State Administration Council, none have sanctioned the State Security and Peace Commission, the junta’s new administrative body. This failure suggests that the sanctioning governments lack the vigilance and commitment necessary to ensure the effectiveness of their Myanmar sanctions’ regimes.

98. In July 2025, the United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control made the surprising decision to remove four companies and four individuals from its Specially Designated Nationals list, lifting the US sanctions that were imposed against them. The Treasury Department had previously sanctioned these entities and individuals for their ties to the junta. All four companies had been linked to the Myanmar military’s procurement of weapons and supplies, including in the Special Rapporteur’s previous reports. In August, the Special Rapporteur wrote to the United States government to ask for the rationale behind this action. As of early October, he had not received a reply. In August, the junta reportedly signed contracts with two US lobbying firms to help influence United States policy toward Myanmar.

VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations

99. **The crisis in Myanmar remains invisible to most of the world, and the inattention and inaction of the international community has made the crisis significantly worse.**

100. **As conditions continue to deteriorate for millions of people in Myanmar, the military junta has escalated its use of sophisticated weapons of war to target civilians. Actions by some States have demonstrated the potential of international action to save untold numbers of lives. Unfortunately, many of these actions have stalled or been abandoned.**

101. **It is critical that the international community refocus and re-engage on the situation in Myanmar and make this invisible crisis visible. Governments should publicly and proactively stand with the people of Myanmar, hosting legitimate political representatives, pro-democracy activists and human rights defenders for public discussions on the human rights situation in Myanmar. Parliaments should convene public hearings on the crisis in Myanmar and pass measures to address it and its consequences.**

102. **The Special Rapporteur calls on States to take action to deny the junta the three things it requires to continue its attacks on and oppression of the people of Myanmar: money, weapons and legitimacy. To this end, he calls on States to:**

(a) **Sanction the State Security and Peace Commission, which has replaced the State Administration Council as the junta’s principal organ of military control, and**

⁵ Canadian sanctions of Myanma Foreign Trade Bank have been in place since 2012, and Australia sanctioned Myanma Foreign Trade Bank in 2024.

⁶ Canadian sanctions on Myanma Economic Bank have been in place since 2012.

prepare to sanction any military-controlled administration emerging from the upcoming election;

(b) Refrain from removing sanctions on entities with known connections to the Myanmar military and junta;

(c) Impose targeted sanctions on the junta's major sources of revenue and the financial institutions that it uses to repatriate revenues and purchase weapons, including Myanma Economic Bank and Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise;

(d) Sanction arms-dealing networks and entities involved in the provision of aviation fuel to the Myanmar military;

(e) Halt the sale, transfer or transshipment of weapons, dual-use technologies and aviation fuel to Myanmar;

(f) Publicly and unequivocally denounce the junta's planned election, emphasizing that the polls will exacerbate conflict and deepen division in Myanmar;

(g) Refuse to provide any material support for the administration of the planned election and avoid any actions that confer legitimacy on the polls, including sending observers to monitor the election; and

103. ASEAN and its member states should:

(a) Acknowledge the flagrant violations of the Five-Point Consensus by the junta;

(b) Refuse to recognize the junta's sham election as legitimate;

(c) Prohibit junta officials or officials from junta-controlled bodies from representing Myanmar at any ASEAN summits or functions;

(d) Engage with the National Unity Government, ethnic resistance organizations, civil society organizations and other key parties representing the will and interests of the people of Myanmar; and

(e) Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to all populations in need, including by supporting cross-border humanitarian assistance delivered through local civil society organizations.

104. The Special Rapporteur urges financial institutions to terminate all relationships with state-owned banks in Myanmar and undertake enhanced due diligence on all relationships and transactions related to Myanmar.

105. To end impunity and ensure accountability for international crimes committed in Myanmar, States should:

(a) Refer the situation in Myanmar to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court under article 14 of the Rome Statute, requesting an investigation into alleged crimes that have been committed against the people of Myanmar;

(b) Support efforts to hold perpetrators of atrocity crimes accountable in impartial and independent courts, including the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice and national courts in countries with universal jurisdiction laws;

(c) Support the National Unity Government and other governance institutions in developing robust courts and justice mechanisms; and

(d) Support human rights defenders and civil society organizations to collect evidence of crimes in Myanmar, including by providing robust funding for documentation initiatives.

106. The Special Rapporteur calls on the international community to devote the resources and political capital necessary to address the devastating humanitarian and human rights crisis in Rakhine State and refugee camps in Bangladesh.

107. He calls on States to:

(a) **Contribute robust financial resources to humanitarian relief for internally displaced persons in Rakhine State, Rohingya and ethnic Rakhine refugees in Bangladesh, and Rohingya communities across the region;**

(b) **Open or expand programs for the temporary protection and resettlement of Rohingya refugees; and**

(c) **Work to support a resolution of the crisis in Myanmar that guarantees Rohingya people citizenship, full enjoyment of human rights, security, the restoration of property rights, and the ability to voluntarily return to their homelands.**

108. **He urges United Nations officials, humanitarian agencies, Bangladesh and the Arakan Army to urgently coordinate the delivery of life-saving cross-border aid to internally displaced persons and other vulnerable populations in Rakhine State, including Rakhine, Rohingya and other ethnic groups, on the basis of need.**

109. **He calls on Bangladesh to:**

(a) **Accept all Rohingya refugees fleeing violence and persecution and halt all efforts to push back refugees at the border or deport refugees to Myanmar;**

(b) **Ensure access to education and livelihoods for Rohingya refugees; and**

(c) **Take all reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations by Rohingya armed groups on Bangladesh territory, including abductions and forcible recruitment in refugee camps.**

110. **He calls on the United League of Arakan and the Arakan Army to:**

(a) **Publicly affirm the fundamental human rights of all in Rakhine State, including the Rohingya community;**

(b) **Give clear, unequivocal orders to Arakan Army soldiers to refrain from human rights violations against Rohingya civilians;**

(c) **Lift any restrictions on movement and livelihoods that are inconsistent with international human rights law and international humanitarian law;**

(d) **Investigate in good faith credible reports of human rights violations by Arakan Army soldiers and hold perpetrators accountable;**

(e) **Support and cooperate with an independent, impartial investigation of human rights violations in Rakhine State; and**

(f) **Initiate dialogue with Rohingya community leaders in Rakhine State and abroad, including those who have alleged grave human rights violations by Arakan Army soldiers.**

111. **The United States should build on its new commitments of support for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh by reversing cuts in vital humanitarian aid for the people of Myanmar, including refugees in neighboring countries. Other countries should also restore and increase funding levels to provide a more balanced mix of financial support among donor countries.**

112. **Citizens around the world who believe in human rights, must step up to the challenge presented by those who use fear, racism, xenophobia and grievance to attack and undermine human rights and human decency. They should call upon their governments to support human rights and humanitarian aid. They should vigorously support government leaders who do so.**

113. **Organizations that support human rights should advance the case for human rights in the public sphere, including on social media. They should prioritize advocacy activities that help to organize and mobilize public support. This should include working in coalition with other organizations and networks that share a commitment to principles and values that are under siege. Citizens from all walks of life should be provided with meaningful opportunities to support human rights and humanitarian aid for those in need in Myanmar and elsewhere. Allied public officials need to know that they are not alone.**

114. The world is at a crossroads. It is time for an all-hands-on-deck approach to defending and promoting human rights and human decency in Myanmar and everywhere innocent people are under attack and human suffering is on the rise.

Advance unedited version